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Curry: Partitioning Community Property.

PARTITIONING COMMUNITY PROPERTY
E. LOU CURRY

If there is one thing that the people are entitled to expect from
their lawmakers, it is rules of law that will enable individuals to
tell whether they are married and, if so, to whom.'
It would seem that since the above statement the law as to valid
marriages and divorces has become sufficiently settled to prevent such
an utterance today. However, as to dividing the estate of the parties
upon divorce, it may still be difficult for an individual to ascertain just
what the law is and how to apply it to various facts.
In Texas, the division of the estate of the parties upon divorce is
governed by Section 3.63 of the Family Code 2 which provides:
In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems
just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and
any children of the marriage.
This act is mandatory,8 and raises a multitude of complex problems,
most of which center around the words, "division of the estate." The
estate subject to division by the court pronouncing the decree of
divorce includes all the property of the parties; community and separate. 4 The partition is governed by the general rules of equity having
due regard to the nature of the property and the relative rights of the
parties and the children. 5 A wide discretion is vested in the trial court"
in that it can make any reasonable division of the community or separate personalty that it sees fit.7

The trial courts are usually concerned with two types of partition:
partition in kind and partition by sale and division of the proceeds.
A third type of partition is accomplished by vesting title in one of the
spouses and giving a lien to the other for his or her proportionate share.
One major reason that partitioning is so important is that the term
"estate" as used in the statute includes all the property owned by the
parties at the time of the divorce. The trial court must first divide the
1 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 1220, 92 L. Ed. 1561, 1571 (1948).
2 TEx. FAMILY CODE § 3.63 (1970), repealing TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4638 (1960),
which reads substantially the same. All cases cited in the comment refer to art. 4638.
3 Ex parte Scott, 123 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Sup. 1939) referring to TEX. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 4638 (1960).
4 McCart v. McCart, 275 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1955, no writ).
5 Sibley v. Sibley, 286 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ dism'd); Swisher
v. Swisher, 190 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1945, no writ).
0 Eaton v. Eaton, 226 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1950, no writ); Earnest
v. Earnest, 223 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1949, no writ).
7 Keene v. Keene, 445 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, writ dism'd).
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separate realty from the community realty, and then partition the
8
community estate in such a manner as will be just and right.
The statute 9 has put a duty on the divorce court to partition community property.' 0 The word "shall" as used in the article is mandatory
and has for its purpose the prevention of multiplicity of suits." The
courts have stated that no final judgment in a divorce case can be rendered and entered, where no property settlement is properly accomplished.' 2
As to community property of which no disposition is made by the
divorce decree, the wife is not precluded from claiming her rights
therein, and the divorced parties become joint owners or tenants in
common.' 3 The statute14 applies only to divorce action and does not
apply in litigation subsequent to divorce.' 5 The power of the court to
make an unequal division is limited to the suit for divorce, therefore
it may not be exercised in a subsequent suit for the division of undisclosed community property.' In a suit brought for the division of
community property after divorce, the parties are treated as joint
owners as if they had never been married.'
It can thus be seen that a divorce court has wide discretion in deter.
mining what portion of the community estate and the husband's sepa.
rate estate should be adjudged to the wife. It is also clear that as to a
partitioning suit brought after divorce for a division of undivided community property the court does not have discretion and must at that
time divide the community property according to the interest of the
parties in the property. It also becomes clear that the court must make
a determination as to the character of the property it is to divide-is it
community or separate property.
COMMUNITY OR SEPARATE PROPERTY

The new Family Code' 8 characterizes community property in a
negative fashion by defining it as property owned other than separate
property. Separate property is defined as:
8 15 BAYLOR L. REv. 237, 240 (1963).
9TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4638 (1960), repealed by TEX. FAMILY CODE § 3.63
(1970).
10 Hailey v. Hailey, 331 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Sup. 1960); Ex parte Scott, 123 S.W.2d 306
(Tex. Sup. 1939).
11 Pelham v. Sanders, 290 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1956, no writ).
12 Restelle v. Williford, 364 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1963, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
18 Cline v. Cline, 323 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
14 Tax. FAMILY CODE § 3.63 (1970).
15 Angerstein v. Angerstein, 389 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1965, no
writ).
16 Wade v. Wade, 295 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956, no writ).
17 Id., e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 425 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1968, writ dism'd).
18 Tax. FAMILY CODE § 5.01 (1970).
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(1) the property owned or claimed by the spouse before marriage;
(2) the property acquired by the spouse during marriage by gift,
devise, or descent; and
(3) the recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during
marriage, except any recovery for loss of earning capacity during
marriage.' 9
The code also provides that "property possessed by either spouse during
' 20
or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property.
Thus the character of property as separate or community is fixed by
21
operation of law upon certain facts.

WHAT

Is

"PROPERTY"

The word property is a very comprehensive term, having a broad
and exceedingly complex meaning.2 2 Property normally includes everything that is the subject of ownership, or has value, including every
species of valuable right and interest, i.e., real and personal property,
easements, franchises, and incorporeal hereditaments. 23 It becomes
increasingly clear that the meaning of the word property cannot be
fixed. The law generally characterizes property as either real or personal. 24 Personal property includes everything except real estate, which
is the subject of ownership.2 5
Using these guidelines, in most cases it is not a difficult determination to establish what is the "estate of the parties"; the estate being
composed of the separate and community property. The more difficult
determination is: What is property within the meaning of Section 3.63
of the Family Code and in subsequent litigation for partition? Having
determined that the meaning is unclear and cannot be fixed 26 and that
it is an extremely comprehensive word, this discussion must be limited
to a few problem areas regarding a determination of what is "property"
within the meaning of the phrase "estate of the parties." The recent
concern of the courts has been in the area of benefits accruing to either
spouse as a result of employment or contract, including life insurance
plans, annuities, retirement benefits, pensions and the like. An examination of recent cases would show that the "key" to determining if the
interest is sufficient to bring this type of "property" within the purview
of the divorce court is in the term "vested rights."
19 Id.
20 TEx. FAMILY CODE
21 Kellett v. Trice, 95
22 73 C.J.S. PROPERTY

23
24

Id. See also

§ 5.02 (1970).

Tex. 160, 66 S.W. 51 (1902).
§ 1 (1951).

BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY

1382 (4th ed. 1951).

Erwin v. Steele, 228 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

25 Id.
26 Id.
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RIGHTS

A "vested right" has been defined briefly as an immediate, fixed right
of possession or future enjoyment.2 7 The uncertainty of the right to a
28
future enjoyment distinguishes a "vested" from "contingent" interest.
A contingent interest is not subject to division, while a "vested interest"
is a species of "property" subject to division by the divorce court.
A number of cases in recent years have dealt with the problems of
"vested rights." An examination of the most significant will shed some
light on the attitude of the courts.
It is not necessary that property be reducible to immediate possession
before the court can take jurisdiction to determine the parties' rights
therein. 29 The question of whether or not a profit-sharing plan, a trust
agreement and a retirement annuity plan were property, and if so,
were community property, was discussed in Herring v. Blakely. ° The
court based its decision on determining if sufficient interest in the plan
had "vested" to make it property and subject to division. The plans
in issue contained a formula by which an employee's account became
vested up to a certain percentage at the end of each year of continuous
employment. The plans were brought into existence during the marriage, all contributions made during marriage, and sufficiently vested
during the marriage to be divisible upon divorce. In support of their
decision the court said:
There is no requirement in Texas that community property must
be reducible to immediate possession before a divorce court can
take jurisdiction to determine the parties' rights therein. Community rights may exist in interest that cannot 1 be reduced to
possession, such as remainder or reversion rights.3
In Berg v. Berg32 the court considered the railroad retirement pension of the husband to be "property" and therefore subject to division
upon divorce. The husband in this case was retired and drawing the
pension at the time of the divorce. The courts have held that contracts
to manage insurance companies constituted community property sub33
ject to division upon divorce.
The court of civil appeals in a very recent case, Williamson v. Williamson,3 4 considered the rights of husband and wife in a retirement
plan. The sole question on appeal was whether or not the trial court
27 See Du Pre v. Du Pre, 271 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954, no writ).
28Jones v. Hext, 67 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1933, writ ref'd).
29 Herring v. Blakeley, 385 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex. Sup. 1965).
3o Id.

31Id. at 847.
32 Berg v. Berg, 115 S.W.2d 1171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1938, writ dism'd).
33 Gillis v. Gillis, 435 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ dism'd).
34 Williamson v. Williamson, 457 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, writ filed).
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properly awarded an interest in two retirement plans to the wife. In
upholding the award the court stated:
[R]etirement benefits and pension plan benefits of the husband are
earned property rights belonging to the community estate and are
distributable to the wife when the marriage is dissolved, even
though payment under the plans may be contingent and are to
take place, if at all, in the future.35
However, this broad statement must be restricted to the facts in the
case. The plans existed at the time of the marriage; and in this respect
the court declared:
[E]xistence or nonexistence of the marriage at the time of incipiency of the right by which title finally vests determines whether
the property is community or separate.36
The facts in Williamson further show that the plans ripened or
"vested" when the husband reached the age fifty-five, since age fifty-five
was the first time benefits could commence. The husband reached age
fifty-five on May 15, 1969, and filed suit for divorce May 26, 1969. The
court in referring to the "ripening" of the plans held that since the
husband's two retirement plans "matured" during his marriage, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife one-half
of the benefits if, as and when they were paid to the husband.
In Matthews v. Matthews,3 7 the court considered a disability insurance policy purchased during marriage, with a disability occurring
during marriage and resulting monthly benefits paid. The trial court
ordered that the disability income payments which were to accrue in
the future to be paid one-half to each party. The court relied on Herring v. Blakeley38 in determining that the plan had vested at the time
of divorce.
A number of cases in recent years have dealt with military retirement
plans. In Kirkham v. Kirkham,3 9 decided in 1960, the husband had
completed twenty-two and a half years of military service at the time
of the divorce although he had not yet retired. The court in upholding
an award of an interest in the future retirement benefits to the wife said:
The retirement pay account is not a gift or gratuity .

. . ,

but is an

earned property right which accrues by reason of his years of
service in the military service. The40earnings of the husband during
marriage are community property.
35 Id.

at 314.

361d.

414 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, no writ).
385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Sup. 1965).
39 Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, no writ).
40 Id. at 394.
37
38
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In computing the community interest in a military retirement pension to be paid in the future, the court should determine the percentage
of the interest of each, spouse, i.e. when the husband has served twentyfour years and was married for twenty of those years, the community
interest of the wife in the future payments is represented as 10/24ths
41
interest.
42
Military retirement benefits were again considered in Mora v. Mora.
The husband at the time of the divorce had completed twenty-five years
and eight months of military service, the last fourteen years and eight
months while married. The court in holding that the divorce court
erred in not considering the retirement plan in the division of the
community property, specifically ruled that the wife's interest should
have been considered. The court pointed out that:
It is true that, at the time of the trial, appellee had not retired
from the military service and that he would be entitled to no
payments until his actual retirement.... [s]ince he had served...
for a length of time sufficient to entitle him to retirement benefits,
he has obtained a property right which is vested even though the
4
benefits were not payable at the time the divorce was granted. 3
(Emphasis added.)
The court went on to point out that a husband's interest in an armed
services retirement plan was an "earned property" right which had
accrued by reason of military service, and by statute, the portion thereof
earned during marriage constituting community property.
There would seem to be some inconsistency concerning the inception of title rule as discussed in Williamson,44 and the decisions in
both the Mora45 and Kirkham4" cases. Williamson held that the time
of incipiency of right by which title finally vests determines whether
property is community or separate. In both Mora and Kirkham the
husband had entered the military service before marriage and in both
cases the court held that the part of the retirement accruing during
the marriage was community property. The question of whether the
retirement fund is community or separate is moot as to a divorce court
since their wide discretion allows an equitable division of all the "estate of the parties." Further, if it is determined that a retirement fund
is separate property using the incipiency of title rule, the community
41 Webster v. Webster, 442 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, no writ).
42 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ dism'd).

Id.
44 457
45 429
46 335
43

at 662.
S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, writ filed).
S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ dism'd).
S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, no writ).
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would be entitled to reimbursement under the "tracing" theory. 47 In
noncontributory pension funds the only way to trace is to determine
the number of years the community "contributed" to the pension.
The mathematical formula would be the same even if the inception
of title rule is disregarded and the fund is considered community
property during the years of the marriage.
The supreme court's decision in Busby v. Busby 48 is the most recent
concerning military retirement benefits. Here the parties were married
in 1946, and divorced in 1963. The husband entered the United States
Air Force in September, 1942, and in September, 1962, had completed
twenty years of service and thus became eligible for retirement. The
divorce decree disposed of certain real and personal property, but no
disposition was made of the retirement benefits. On November 1, 1967,
the wife filed a suit to recover and have partitioned equally the disability retirement benefits of the husband. The husband had not voluntarily retired, but had been ordered retired due to a diabetic
condition and thyroid deficiency on the same day the divorce was
granted. The court held that the military retirement pay was an earned
property right constituting community property, subject to partition
equally between the husband and wife. They became tenants in common or joint owners when the benefits were not divided by the trial
court in its judgment granting the divorce.
Associate Justice Walker wrote the Busby dissent, joined by Associate Justices Greenhill and McGee. The points of the dissent concern
the supreme court's ruling in two areas: (1) That title to benefits payable in the future vest when one becomes eligible for the benefits; and
(2) Res judicata as it applies to division of property. 49 The dissent indicated that when retirement benefits are payable in the future, and
rest on a statute that is subject to modification or repeal, the interest
should not be held to constitute property, but that the trial court could
properly take retirement benefits into consideration in the exercise
of their broad powers in making a just and equitable division of property.
No cases have been found that distinguish "estate of the parties"
and community or separate property as defined in the Family Code. 50
That "something" could be included in the estate of the parties that
was not "property" finds no support in past case law. However, holding
that property interests "vest" upon becoming eligible for retirement
47 See generally McKnight, Matrimonial Property, 22 Sw. L.J. 129 (1968), McKnight,
Family Law, 24 Sw. L. J. 49 (1970), Bartke, Yours, Mine and Ours-Separate Title and

Community Funds, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 137 (1969).

48 Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
49 Id. at 555.
50 TEx. FAMILY CODE § 5.01, § 5.02 (1970).
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will, as indicated in the Busby dissent, produce inequitable results. To
illustrate, it would seem from the holdings in Busby, Mora and Kirkham, that upon completion of twenty years service the retirement
rights vest; a serviceman being eligible for a retirement pension upon
completion of twenty years service.5 1 From these holdings one could
surmise that prior to serving twenty years there is no interest in the retirement that the divorce court could consider "property" or that could
be divided as part of the "estate of the parties." Therefore, if in the
Busby case the husband had nineteen years of service and had not been
retired for disability, would there be any interest in his future retirement that could be divided upon divorce? It would be mere conjecture
at this point to attempt to determine the outcome of a case where a
husband and wife are divorced when the husband has nineteen years
service, and a year later the wife brings suit for her interest in the
retirement fund that "vested" after the divorce. The ex-wife could base
her community property interest on the court's prior holdings that
retirement programs are an earned property right which accrues by
reason of years of service. It seems that in such a case the divorce court
would have been precluded from dividing the retirement benefits. As
in Mora the "if, when, and as received" approach would not be applicable, the fund not having "vested." In all the cases discussed the
husband had completed at least twenty years service at the time of the
divorce.
To reach equitable results the court should either:
1. Allow the divorce court to partition "if, when, and as received"
the future retirement plan regardless of the vesting of such plan.
2. Allow the divorce court to consider potential retirement interest
in making an equitable division of the estate of the parties.
The only logical solution is the "if, when, and as received" approach. 52 However, if this were taken to extremes the court could be
faced with the wife of a serviceman with five years service requesting
an "if, when, and as received" interest in a retirement plan that would
vest fifteen years in the future.
Mr. Hughes in his excellent article 3 suggests that perhaps the court
should depart from Herring v. Blakeley and rest the matter on a possessory interest, or at least an interest proximately anticipated to become possessory.54 This interest could be calculated in the following
manner:
51 See Title 10 U.S.C.A. § 8911, § 6321 et seq., § 3991 et seq.
52 Hughes, Community-Property Aspects of Profit-Sharing and Pension Plans in Texas-

Recent Developments and Proposed Guidelines for the Future, 44 TEx. L. REV. 860 (1966).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 887.
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The court could either order payment of present amounts by the
husband from community or separate assets or order the husband
to pay such amounts if, as, and when received; the decision regarding which alternative to choose would be based on all the facts
and circumstances, including the availability of other assets, the
likelihood that an interest would become possessory, and any other
relevant considerations.r5
It must be kept in mind that military retirement is a unique system
and such problems should not be met in other forms of pension plans,
either contributory or non-contributory. In civilian retirement it is
normal for the employee's rights to vest quickly (usually annually) in
the fund. The military retirement fund has no contract, no actual
fund, and is created by statute.5 6
The Busby case raised other interesting problems. As indicated in
the dissent, the doctrine of res judicata must be considered in partitioning suits brought after divorce.
RES JUDICATA

The general rule is that a judgment is final as to issues actually determined and all other issues which the parties might have litigated
in the case. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule of convenience and
will not be enforced if the failure to have a question determined will
have unjust results. 57 It would seem that suits for partitioning of community property after divorce are both exceptions and limitations on
the doctrine of res judicata. The court in Busby said:
It is well settled that where, as here, a divorce decree fails to provide for a division of community property, the husband and wife
become tenants in common or joint owners thereof. (citations
omitted) Since this property was not partitioned at the time of
the divorce, we hold that the judgment entered in the divorce
suit did not preclude the plaintiff from seeking a partition of the
58
undivided community property sought to be partitioned here.
However, the divorce decree is res judicata as to all matters therein
settled, and insofar as it disposes of property rights of the husband and
wife it is an effective adjudication.5 9
55 Id. at 887.

56 Title 10 U.S.C.A. § 8911, § 6321 et. seq., § 3991 et. seq.
57 Vann v. Calcasieu Trust and Savings Bank, 204 S.W. 1062 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1918, writ ref'd).
58 Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
59 Adams v. Adams, 214 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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To determine the success of a partitioning suit brought after a divorce, it is necessary to ask the following questions:
1. Is the property sufficiently vested to be susceptible of division,
and was it vested during the marriage?
2. Is the property community property?
3. Is the divorce decree and property settlement therein res judicata
to the property in question?
If the property in question is "sufficiently vested"; is community property; and was not considered by the divorce court; the way is clear for
a partitioning suit. Until such a partitioning suit the property is in
the status of joint ownership.6 0
To prevent partitioning suits of undivided community property a
practical approach would be an agreement between the parties, included in the divorce decree, showing that in consideration of the
property awarded to her the wife relinquishes all right and title to any
property of the parties.
CONCLUSION

... [C]ounsel for litigants in a divorce suit should call to the attention of the trial judge all of the assets of the marriage. . . . [T]he
trial judges. . . should inquire as to the existence of insurance or retirement programs to the end that the final judgment fully disposes of all
property valuables of the community." 6' 1
The term "vesting" as used here means the interest that is sufficient
to be subject to a division under the broad equity powers of the divorce
court. Since most profit sharing, pension, insurance, and retirement
plans have a very early "vesting" and are divisible upon divorce the
court should and will look to these assets as part of the estate of the
parties. Military retirement benefits present a definite problem to the
divorce court in light of the recent holdings that military retirement
benefits are not a property interest subject to division until the serviceman has served a sufficient length of time to entitle him to retire.
The true test of these holdings will be a case involving a serviceman
with less than twenty years service at the time of divorce.
0E.g., Cline v. Cline, 323 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
n.r.e.).
61 Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
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